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Abstract: 
Introduction: 
Given that at its centre lies a concern for enduring global social and environmental welfare, 
for many sustainability appears to be a common sense concept. However, in an economic 
system that is based upon continued economic growth, the notion that social and 
environmental imperatives should be at least equal in priority across all sectors of society 
(government, business and civil society) means that sustainability is inherently fraught with 
tensions. A recent review of business and society literature reveals that little analysis has 
been published on the nature of these tensions within and between organisations and sectors, 
including government (Van der Byl & Slawinski, 2015). Further, little critical examination is 
available of why and how, given what is at stake, economic imperatives continue to be 
favoured over social and environmental ones.  
By overlaying Gramsci’s theory of hegemony we suggest that paradox theory, seen as a 
continuous process of organisational learning and improvement through responses to 
tensions, can also describe a means of maintaining a hegemonic core – in our example, that of 
laissez-faire government enshrined in neoliberal economics that drives a business focus on 
profit over environmental and social sustainability. Further, we suggest that this critical lens 
highlights limitations to the readiness and ability of organisations to adapt to divergent 
demands simultaneously.  
Our example highlights divergent stakeholder demands for environmental and social 
sustainability and the means by which governments and businesses have responded to the 
tensions that arise from such demands, which are typically regarded as being in opposition to 
requirements for continued economic growth. In analysing our research data we apply a 
dialectics approach that facilitates a close examination of organisational discourses and 
practices that both encapsulate and seek to manage the tensions associated with demands for 
sustainable business practices. Our analysis provides evidence of an emergent discourse that 
signals a very new direction in those tensions. Because this new discourse also fundamentally 
challenges the core premise of the free market, the regulatory independence of business, it 
has the potential to undermine, or at least significantly change, the hegemony of the current 
economic order by calling for the return of a greater regulatory role for government over 
business practices. 
We first critically review recent history of sustainable development from the perspective of 
the economic sector’s desire to preserve the hegemonic domain of neoliberal, free market 
economics. In doing so we describe the conciliatory actions taken in response to tensions 
created by multiple challenges to that hegemony, often aimed at governments for legislative 
change. We describe how, so far, responses to such challenges have not only been at the 
margins but have been effective in defusing them.   
We draw on primary and secondary data to examine the range and complexity of challenges 
to the New Zealand Government’s core policy driver of economic growth and illustrate the 
means by which that Government responds to them – both discursively and in practice. We 
then present a case that a new set of tensions is emerging that can no longer be so easily 
sidestepped. Significantly, these tensions are coming from within the dominant economic 
bloc itself, with some business leaders acknowledging that the minimal regulatory 
environment that is fundamental to neoliberal ideology is failing to serve their business goals. 
We discuss evidence that these leaders now face a Bakhtinian dialectic dilemma: to call for 
government regulation to protect business investment or to retain business autonomy at any 
cost? 
 
Dialectics, issue management and hegemony 
There are many approaches to analysis of organisational tensions. The constructionist 
approach to analysing organisational processes known as tension-centred analysis (e.g. 
Erbert, Mearns, & Dena, 2005; Jian, 2007) rests on the premise that organisations are 
fundamentally sites of ambiguity and conflict and that tension itself is both natural and the 
driver of change (Seo, Putnam, & Bartunek, 2004). There is a range of tension-centred 
approaches, including irony, opposition, duality, paradox, contradiction, dilemma, double 
bind, and dialectic. Paradox theory as described by Smith and Lewis (2011) seeks both to 
explain and to promote organisations’ management of diverse internal and external pressures 
that generate tension. This particular model suggests that rather than regarding solutions to 
tensions as a choice of one demand over another, as in contingency theory, divergent 
demands can and should be met simultaneously and that such an approach can produce more 
stable outcomes. The process requires continuous effort as new demands are made by, for 
example, a range of stakeholders with opposing interests. The result, according to the theory, 
is a virtuous cycle of organisational learning and improvement. Smith and Lewis (2011) 
explain that earlier conceptions of paradox, dilemmas and dialectics have been regarded as 
separate in their applications: paradox has been conventionally defined as “contradictory yet 
interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time” (p. 386); dilemmas 
suggest tensions with clear advantages posed by competing alternatives; and dialectics 
describe “ongoing process[es] of resolving tensions through integration” (p. 386). However, 
because these conceptions can overlap as, for example, when a dilemma becomes paradoxical 
over time, the integrative model of paradox management is dynamic, accounting for and 
integrating such changes. Thus organisational tensions are seen to emerge and grow in 
relevance until they are accommodated. Such tensions, and their accommodation, can be 
socially constructed and/or material. 
While the paradox model has much merit for organisational practice, in this paper we suggest 
that for critical understanding of organisational responses to tensions there is also merit in 
retaining the concept of the dialectic as a separate element of analysis. We further suggest 
that when the critical cultural studies’ perspective of the dynamics of maintenance of 
hegemonic orders is applied to a dynamic model of tension resolution, it can be seen that the 
process of accommodation in organisational management can serve to mask more macro, 
societal level tensions. By analysing separate responses to issues such as those that arise from 
demands for social and environmental sustainability which often have a common core cause, 
it is possible to see how that core cause can be ignored.  
Dialectics are fundamentally about change (Ollman, 2003) and the tensions that arise, first 
from the conditions that are precursors to change, to the direction of change, to the 
implications of change itself, including the effects on the participating individuals, 
organisations and societies. The two major assumptions shared by many versions of dialectics 
theory are that social phenomena are subject to opposing forces or positions, and that because 
those forces are in constant tension they generate continuous changes as one force becomes 
more prominent and the other pushes back. Hegemony, on the other hand, from Gramsci’s 
(1971) perspective that we adopt here, is about successfully resisting change as hegemony 
can only be maintained by constant adjustment at the margins in order to protect the core. 
According to Gramsci, dominant orders are “both coercive and dependent on the consent of 
those who are coerced into submission” (Holub, 1992, p. 45). In this way hegemony is itself 
dialectical, fraught with tensions on the part of both the dominant and the dominated 
(Mumby, 1997, 2005).  
 
Gramsci’s view of hegemony is thus dynamic. It describes how dominant forces secure their 
legitimacy and maintain a relatively stable state by continuously deflecting tensions and 
challenges through compromise at the margins (Levy, 1997, 2001; Roper, 2005). By this 
process societal expectations are seen to be met, although the reality may be that they are 
materially met only enough to dilute the rationale for and thus weaken the challenge. A 
dialectic approach to hegemony reveals the ways in which discourse is in constant tension as 
it serves to maintain dominant positions and resist opposing discourses. Mumby (1997; 2005) 
takes a communication approach in describing the link between hegemony and dialectics 
within organisational discourse. Indeed, most studies of this kind focus on the communication 
dimensions of organisational processes and dynamics (for example, Ashcraft & Mumby, 
2004; Flemming & Sewell, 2002; Norton & Sadler, 2006; Tracy, 2004), especially the ways 
in which different groups compete to serve their own interest and to control symbolic and 
discursive resources (McPhee & Poole, 2001).  
Our focus is different in that it goes beyond organisations to an analysis of the dynamics of 
intra and inter sector roles and relationships. Specifically, we are interested in the dynamics 
and tensions of relationships within and between governments, organisations, and the 
economic sector in which they function, and in to what extent and how tensions impact on 
ideologically-driven policy decisions. 
As it is for dialectics, hegemony is determined by context, rather than being a universal 
construct. Although it may be replicated elsewhere, domination through hegemony can only 
hold for a specific place and only so long as society will allow it to hold by virtue of 
widespread consent. The compromises that are made in response to challenges to any 
hegemonic order are sufficient to weaken the strength of opposition, but not so great as to 
prevent core dominant practices continuing unchanged.  If this were not the case, the order 
would not be hegemonic. Hegemony can only hold if the core principles of the dominant 
ideology are regarded as “common sense”. If the principles no longer make sense for that 
particular time and place, the hegemonic order is replaced by something else that may or may 
not include elements of the displaced values and that may not ever be sufficiently embraced 
to establish a new ‘normal’ set of principles.  
 
Neoliberal hegemony and sustainability 
The most recent hegemonic balance in Western states, notably those of the US, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK, is embodied in neoliberal economics, characterised by 
global free markets, unregulated currencies, individualisation of society, and minimal 
intervention by governments.  The degree to which neoliberal ideals are exercised vary, with 
European governments, in general, exercising a more moderate form than those of the 
countries just cited (Matten & Moon, 2008). New Zealand is recognised as having moved to a 
relatively strong form, with removal of all industry tariffs and subsidies associated (Kelsey, 
1997).   
The hegemony of the free market, created and maintained by governments to the advantage 
of corporations (Geels, 2014; Marens, 2013) has successfully held since the early 1980s when 
it was advocated as the only viable substitute for the hitherto dominant system of Keynesian 
economics. Neoliberal, free market or laissez-faire economics rests on the core premise that 
with minimal state regulation, business will self-regulate for both maximum profit and public 
demand through the correcting action of market forces (Burchell, 1996).  The advent of what 
is commonly called globalisation served to greatly strengthen that core, as many corporations 
have now accumulated more wealth than some nation states and so can potentially wield 
greater influence over policy decisions (Castells, 2000).  
As for all hegemonic orders, neoliberalism exists under tension and has had to fend off 
challenges, compromising at critical junctures in order to protect the ideological core.  The 
greatest current challenge to the independence of the economic sector strikes at the heart of 
the system itself: widespread recognition of the failure of the market to protect either the 
environment or social wellbeing. Market failures have become evident through, for example, 
unsustainable and inefficient use of non-renewable resources, failure of business to account 
for externalities such as waste and pollution, including the less visible but globally 
threatening climate change, and rapidly rising inequalities in wealth distribution within and 
between nation states. This has proved to be a growing challenge. In more recent years, most 
particularly since the advent of the postmodern risk society (Beck, 1992, 2006), increasing 
public concern about and activist intervention in corporate activity has resulted in society 
calling for accountability for such externalities.  
In response, governments and businesses have, to greater or lesser degrees, turned to notions 
of sustainability. However, as noted in the 1991 Brundtland report, sustainability “is not a 
fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change.... Painful choices have to be made” 
(WCED, 1987). In making such choices governments have to deal with tensions from a range 
of stakeholders that goes beyond concerned citizens of a risk society (Beck, 1997) and 
includes political opponents, politicians within their own ranks, international governments 
and consumers. Conservative governments, in particular, face tensions between the 
expectations of their key electorate, the business sector, and the other diverse electorates that 
make up general society. If business wish to retain their regulatory independence, in line with 
the neoliberal model, they must respond to societal and supply chain expectations before 
governments are forced to regulate, or they must attempt to manage the parameters of any 
environmental and social legislation that may be introduced. This is, in effect, classic issues 
management (Gandy, 1992; Heath, 1997; Heath & Palenchar, 2009; Kuhn, 1997), with 
sustainability as the issue to be managed (Roper, 2012).  
Rather than address the issue of sustainability holistically, the widespread practice has been 
to take a piecemeal approach by attempting to respond to what have commonly been regarded 
as separate issues around the periphery of sustainability as they arise. In practice, however, 
such tensions tend to be overlapping and contradictory. Hence governments cannot appease 
all constituencies simultaneously and are guided in principle by their own ideological beliefs, 
up to the point where these need to be modified because they are no longer politically 
tenable. 
One factor that has facilitated the separation of sustainability related issues is the range of 
diverse and often contradictory discourses that describe sustainability itself and which 
determine organisational responses to the core issues. Indeed, the discourses themselves are 
illustrative of the tensions inherent in notions of sustainability. In line with mainstream 
government and business thinking (the ‘discourse coalition’ of policymakers and incumbent 
firms described by Hajer (1995; see also Geels, 2014), responses to sustainability have tended 
to be at the very weak (Turner, 1993) end of the spectrum, with little or no substantive 
change to organisational practice.  
One discourse that has been particularly influential is that of ecological modernisation 
(Jänicke, 2008) Hajer, 1995), largely grounded in what is commonly referred to as the 
“business case” for sustainability. In practice, it can be viewed as an economic mechanism 
for encouraging changes towards more environmentally and socially sustainable business 
practices and so its ideals can be said to be in line with business goals. For example, 
reductions in energy use and waste should increase profit. Beyond such ‘low hanging fruit’ 
(Laszlo & Zhexembayeva, 2011), however, financial returns tend to require that businesses 
adopt technological change and a long term view, rather than prioritising short term profit 
(Dryzek, 1997).  In many ways, ecological modernisation fits within the discourse of 
sustainable development, with its key difference lying in its focus on practical and profitable 
solutions to environmental problems that allow the underlying economic model to continue. 
Hence its particular appeal to and utility for conservative governments and the dominant 
business sector. 
As for the discourse of sustainable development (Christoff, 1996), the discourse of ecological 
modernisation, and its associated practices, takes both “weak” and “strong” forms with the 
weak form focusing on economic advantages at the expense of a wider ranging and holistic 
view of improvement for all of society. The weak form essentially entails a “business as 
usual” approach, based upon competitive advantage. By seeming to respond to environmental 
problems it can also effectively defuse arguments for more radical environmentalism. In its 
stronger forms ecological modernisation requires that governments take an “enlightened long 
term view” and “a holistic analysis of economic and environmental processes rather than 
piecemeal focus on particular environmental abuses” (Christoff, 1996, p.143). For 
governments that adopt this view, notably European governments, ecological modernisation 
entails some level of “smart” environmental regulation that can include economic incentives, 
and a consensus approach to flexible policy formation (Jänicke, 2008). Indeed, Jänicke 
identifies “smart” regulation as a key driving force for ecological modernisation. Thus the 
enactment of ecological modernisation relies not only upon implementation of the 
Precautionary Principle (O'Riordan, Cameron, & Jordan, 2001; O'Roirdan & Jordan, 1995) 
but also upon restructuring of the dominant market-led economic ideology. In spite of this, as 
Dryzek also notes, all forms of ecological modernisation discourse ignore the notion of limits 
to growth.  
 In this paper we take the example of the New Zealand Government’s responses to 
sustainability challenges over a seven-year period, from late 2008 to mid-2016, as an 
exemplar of government responses to internal and external pressures for policy responses to 
sustainable development. This has been a period of continuous government (three, three-year 
terms) by the conservative National Party, led by Prime Minister John Key. It stands in 
contrast to the previous nine years of a centre-left Labour-led Government that had built its 
platform upon leadership in sustainable development. Thus the current conservative 
Government has had to manage expectations set up by the previous Government, protect its 
own neoliberal ideals and those of its key business constituency, and justify its practices in 
the face of growing concern about environmental degradation.  
 
Method 
Our analysis is longitudinal and is primarily based on discourses revealed in government 
speeches and press releases that are publicly available on the New Zealand Government 
website (www.beehive.govt.nz). It focuses on how the Government’s discourse has 
approached expectations of sustainable development, particularly those that set up ideological 
tensions between environmental and economic priorities. Because of the long period under 
examination, we focus upon critical sustainability issues, particularly climate change, and 
junctures when the Government has had to deal with different, often contradictory, pressures, 
from a range of stakeholders.  
 
As a counter point to the Government derived data, and to provide the context for policy 
statements by way of oppositional discourses that set up tensions that the Government has to 
negotiate, we also draw upon a range of supporting and oppositional discourses. These are 
sourced from 24 interviews conducted in late 2014 as part of a longitudinal study into 
sustainable business practices in New Zealand (Collins & Roper, 2015), submissions and 
statements from business groups such as the New Zealand Sustainable Business Council (a 
subsidiary of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development), Pure Advantage, 
and the industry group, Federated Farmers.   
 
Our approach to discourse draws on that of Norman Fairclough (l992, 2000) in that it does 
not regard language as an independent, separate phenomenon. Rather, it is indicative of the 
discursive and social practices that shape language use; word choice and the meanings 
ascribed to words, for example, vary according to conscious or unconscious strategic intent. 
Thus we examine texts and the modes of argument found in them as both reflections of 
ideology as well as indicators of practice. In particular, we examine the discourse of a 
Government, as the holder of institutional power, in the face of opposing discourses that 
challenge the ideological foundations that drive the ways in which they exercise that power in 
policy.  
 
Tension-centred analysis complements discourse analysis. As discussed above, there are many 
approaches to tension-centred analysis, including paradox and dialectics, and it has been suggested that 
because such approaches can overlap at times they should be integrated (Smith & Lewis, 2011). As also 
discussed earlier in this paper, we adhere to a dialectics approach in order to analyse specific responses 
to challenges as we see these potentially as strategic measures to deflect challenges and protect an 
ideological core.  
Two major assumptions shared by the many versions of dialectics theory are that social 
phenomena are subject to opposing forces or positions and that these forces, being in constant tension, 
create continuous changes as one force becomes more prominent or powerful and the other pushes back. 
Rather than make a dichotomous choice, dialectics theory suggests that we manage tensions sometimes 
by making “either-or” choices, but also sometimes by “both-and” choices—that is, finding ways to 
embrace or transcend the tension. The literature offers a variety of potential responses to dialectics. 
While different labels have been used, these responses comprise four basic alternatives: selection 
(selecting one pole and ignoring the other), separation (addressing each pole separately in time or 
space), integration (addressing both poles simultaneously through reframing or synthesis), and 
withdrawal (exiting from the relationship) (Gibbs, 2009; Seo et al., 2004; Tracy, 2004; Zorn, Roper, & 
Richardson, 2014). The dialectics approach of Mikhail Bakhtin as adapted primarily by Baxter and 
colleagues (Baxter, 1990; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996), and applied to organizational contexts (Erbert, 
Mearns, & Dena, 2005) suggests that a dialectic has two appealing extremes that push and pull the 
participants in a relationship. In this approach dialectics are both interdependent and mutually negating, 
meaning that both poles of a dialectic are desirable, yet enhancing one is at the expense of the other.   
 
Findings: 
From late 2008, when it came into power, one of the key differences between the discourse of 
the conservative National-led Government and that of its Labour predecessor was that the 
word ‘sustainability’, along with its variants such as ‘sustainable development’, was dropped 
quickly and almost entirely from discussions of environmental issues (Mella, 2012).  In 
addition, more specific, related terms were also dropped, including ‘carbon neutral’, and 
‘carbon footprint’, in spite of the fact that the Government maintained that climate change 
was its main environmental priority. Instead, the implied and overt emphasis was exclusively 
on economic growth. 
It was clear that public expectations of environmental care, in recognition of the country’s 
highly valuable “clean green” brand (Ministry for the Environment, 2001; Roper, 2012) and 
bolstered by the previous Government, created opposing discourses and hence dialectic 
tensions with the economic agenda that served the new Government’s key electoral 
constituents, including the farming sector. Significantly, agriculture produces 48% of New 
Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions, two-thirds of which are methane from farming cattle 
and sheep. Further, methane emissions are estimated to have increased ten percent since 
1990, the highest rate in the world, as a result of dairy farm expansion (Pullar-Strecker, 
2015). Overall, the Government dealt with the tensions by actively side-lining environmental 
discourses, by paying only lip service to key issues such as the Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS), and/or by the dual device of simultaneously promoting the intent and minimising the 
practice, as explained further below in the case of the ETS.  
Environmental issues were relegated to what the Government termed its “Bluegreen Agenda” 
that, although classified as “the bible” for New Zealand’s environmental programme (South, 
2009), was referred to only within the Environment and the Climate Change Issues portfolios, 
both led by the agenda’s creator, Nick Smith. It was clearly stated that the “Government's 
environmental agenda is about rolling back Nanny State regulations and achieving better 
environmental outcomes through financial incentives” (Smith, 2009f). The agenda generated 
tensions throughout all portfolios, especially with regard to modifications of significant 
legislation, including the ETS, which were seen to impact the nation’s environmental 
credentials.  
 
Climate change and the Bluegreen Agenda 
There is evidence to suggest that Smith, as the key and, at least initially, the sole advocate of 
the Bluegreen agenda experienced pressure to conform to the Government’s economic 
growth agenda. Smith used the discourse of the Bluegreen agenda to advocate a balance 
between environmental and economic goals  (Smith, 2010a, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b) and, in a 
rare reference to ‘sustainability’, stated that “resource use must be based on sustainability” 
(Smith, 2009g). However, policy changes enacted under the umbrella of the Bluegreen 
agenda suggested that achievement of ‘balance’ was consistently in favour of economic 
growth, as described below.  
One of the primary, inescapable environmental issues in the long term has been climate 
change. This issue affects numerous areas of government policy, including transport and 
agriculture, yet over the entire period of our analysis it has increasingly caused tensions 
within government and between government and its external stakeholders, including the 
international community. The Labour Government had introduced the ETS just prior to the 
2008 election. In acknowledging New Zealand’s geographical isolation and reliance upon its 
‘clean, green’ positioning, the then Prime Minister stated: 
New Zealand needs to go the extra mile to lower greenhouse gas emissions and 
increase sustainability … In our high value markets in Europe, we face increasing 
pressure on our trade and tourism, from competitors who are all too ready to use 
against us the distance our goods must travel to market, and the distance tourists must 
travel to us (Clark, 2007).  
One of the National Government’s early actions was to “moderate” the scheme to be 
“workable and affordable” (Smith, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e), as well as “realistic about how 
much a small country like New Zealand can contribute” (Smith, 2009e). Much of the 
business sector was supportive of the review because of concern that business might be put at 
an economic disadvantage by international competitors who were not subject to such a 
system, the same discourse used in opposition to the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 (Roper, 2012).  
The revised scheme extended the exclusion of the agriculture sector from 2013 to 2015 
(Smith, 2010a), with caveats from other Government Ministers that “we’ll only bring 
agriculture in if it’s consistent with what we see from other producers around the world”, and 
that to bring the sector into the ETS earlier “would be economic suicide” (Carter, 2011).  
Such statements were in direct contradiction to Smith’s earlier comment that New Zealand 
does not “have the luxury of excluding agriculture when your sector is such a large portion of 
New Zealand emissions” (Smith, 2009i).  
Over the same period the Government also repealed Labour’s Biofuel Sales Obligation on the 
grounds that oil companies may import biofuel from “unsustainable sources” without 
“workable and practical sustainability standards” (Brownlee, 2009), even though the 
Bluegreen agenda had earlier included a proposal to “blend biodiesel into fuel” used and sold 
in New Zealand (Smith, 2006, p. 5). The eventual statement was that the blend of biofuels 
would be supported by grants, but not by mandatory requirements (Smith, 2009h). The 
Associate Minister of Transport distanced himself from environmental issues related to 
transport, stating that “the Government's top priority for the transport network is to maximize 
its contribution to economic growth and productivity” (Guy, 2010). Even though he referred 
to amending the Public Transport Management Act, there was no mention of improving or 
extending the public transport system in the country, or of plans to mitigate or at least reduce 
the 20% of the greenhouse emissions that the sector emits.   
The environmental policies of the Labour-led Government up until late 2008, especially in 
relation to their stated goal of becoming a ‘carbon neutral’ nation, did not fit with the agenda 
of the incoming conservative Government, neither politically in terms of voting 
constituencies nor ideologically. However, while dropping the policies would be viewed 
favourably by the majority of the New Zealand business sector, as indicated by the degree of 
opposition to New Zealand’s 2002 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Roper, 2012) it would 
also generate tensions with other stakeholders who wanted to protect the country’s valuable 
environmental reputation, and with international consumers.  
The new Government initially dealt with the tensions in two ways: by shifting the discourse 
to an ambiguous one of ‘low carbon’, and by effectively ignoring the issue of greenhouse gas 
emissions in practice. In justifying the shift they claimed that the carbon neutrality was a 
‘lofty’ and ‘unrealistic’ goal (Smith, 2009a, 2009h) that may have damaged the international 
positioning of New Zealand rather than helping the image of the country as ‘clean and green’. 
No clear definition of ‘low’ was given. Thus they simultaneously sought to proactively 
deflect criticism and set up practices that were more favourable to their business constituents. 
The $10 million carbon neutral programme for the public sector was abandoned in March 
2009 with the funds reprioritized to others areas with “real value for New Zealanders” 
(Smith, 2009b).  
However, the ETS also provided the New Zealand Government with the means of promoting 
and legitimising the country’s environmental credentials internationally. At Copenhagen 
2015 the Prime Minister positioned New Zealand as “the only country in the world that has 
introduced an emissions trading scheme covering all greenhouse gases and all sectors of the 
economy, including agriculture and forestry”, with no reference to the delayed inclusion of 
the agricultural sector (Key, 2009a). Consistent with the discourse of ecological 
modernization, the transition to a low carbon economy would be effected by technological 
development. Under this premise the Prime Minister launched the Primary Growth 
Partnership, a major component of which was to tackle greenhouse gas emissions, with 
funding provided to the NZ Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Research Centre  as  “a key part of 
our sensible and pragmatic approach to responding to climate change” Key (2009b).  
There is clear evidence that the Government’s key business constituents, particularly the 
farming sector, supported its approach to climate change. There was also evidence of 
discursive shifts over time from denial of responsibility for and/or of the issue itself to an 
ecological modernisation approach within the business sector, echoing that of the 
Government. For example, DairyNZ, representing of one of the country’s largest emitting 
industries, approved changes to the ETS on the basis “that we achieve emissions reduction 
through technology change rather than reductions in production” (13 February 2009). 
However, there was increasing international pressure on business for greater sustainability in 
production, a fact recognised sooner by some of New Zealand’s larger exporters than by the 
National Government. Although the signals had been clear much earlier, it was not until 2010 
that this pressure was reflected in the Government discourse with economic growth now 
clearly articulated with environmental protection. The Minister for Agriculture reported to 
Federated Farmers, the country’s largest farming lobby group, that at the World Dairy 
Summit he had been told by a Waitrose buying executive: “if we want Waitrose to buy our 
products, we must meet its standards and expectations around animal welfare, food safety, 
and environmental management” from which he was left “in no doubt that sustainability is 
not a fad. It’s an enduring trend that’s here to stay” (Carter, 2010). Ecological modernization 
remained the basis of the discourse for change, but was now being seen by at least some 
sections of the Government in terms of a need for transformational change. In 2011, the 
Government announced that  
concepts of green growth, green jobs and clean tech are attracting international 
attention with the work of the OECD and the United Nations. This is about New 
Zealand applying some of our best private sector minds to how we ensure we take up 
these green growth opportunities to support the Government’s broader economic 
growth strategy (Brownlee, 2011).  
Thus, in response to international business pressure, the discourse shifted to the “business 
case” for sustainability that had earlier been disregarded by much of the business sector and 
government, but – in the absence of regulation – was still premised upon neoliberal, laissez-
faire ideology.   
Pressure for change was increasingly exerted by New Zealand’s own business sector, and was 
in part being responded to by Government. In sharp contrast to the previous Government’s 
2001 consultation prior to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, February 2011 submissions on 
the Government’s proposed emissions reduction target of 50 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050 
strongly suggested a growing divide between companies that saw advantages in change and 
those that continued to lobby for ‘business as usual’. This time only small majority of the 30 
submissions from major stakeholder groups, representing the high greenhouse gas emitters, 
objected to the targets. Nevertheless, the Government continued to stall expansion of 
environmental legislation ahead of the country’s major trading partners, preferring voluntary 
action in line with the dominant business lobby. Economic growth remained the top priority, 
with no scope for reduced dairy production (Carter, 2011). 
Tensions within the business sector and between business and government continued to grow. 
A new industry lobby group, Pure Advantage, was launched in 2011, with the message that 
“New Zealand urgently needs to improve its own environmental stewardship, to protect the 
clean, green image that benefits so much of what we produce and export’ and that New 
Zealand needs ‘to break out of our short-sighted commodity attitude and embrace our 
competitive advantage in being green” (Pure Advantage, 2011). Significantly, the group 
comprises leaders of many of the country’s most prominent businesses. Their discourse was 
one of ecological modernization and a business case for sustainability, but a much stronger 
version than used by either the Government or the high emitting industries. Further, the group 
was calling for Government leadership in the issue. The Government hit back, with one 
Minister stating that he ''fundamentally disagreed'' with the approach of the group, that New 
Zealand should not ''throw away'' competitive advantages in traditional industries and that 
such a movement towards green growth would be ''a highly dislocating shift that would leave 
us poorer for an extended period of time'' (Mace, 2012). Other groups and individuals were 
also increasingly criticizing Government environmental policies, saying that they pose a risk 
to the country’s valuable brand (see, for example, Kenworthy, 2011). 
The Government did not back down from its priorities of economic growth, its market 
approach to environmental reform, and its discourse of weak sustainability through ecological 
modernisation. In 2014 the Minister for Climate Change Issues stated “New Zealand is doing 
its fair share on climate change, taking into account our unique national circumstances….We 
are leading international research into reducing agricultural emissions, which are a significant 
contributor to total global emissions”… (Groser, 2014). Increases in renewable energy 
production were favourably attributed to the “introduction and refinement of a liberalised 
electricity market” (Bridges, 2015), in direct contrast to the call for Government intervention 
made by organisations such as Pure Advantage.  
Submissions made to Government on their 2016 review of the ETS showed continued and 
growing resistance to the Government’s approach to climate change. That of the New 
Zealand Sustainable Business Council (30 April, 2016), for example, called for “coherent 
government policy across energy, transport, agriculture and infrastructure portfolios, with 
cross party support” implying a long-term approach.  Nevertheless, agriculture was not 
included in the scope of the review on the grounds of the Government’s earlier decision to 
include it only if there were “economically viable and practical technologies to reduce these 
emissions” (Moir, 2015).   
The New Zealand Government signed the 2016 Paris Climate Change Agreement but made it 
very clear that their domestic policies would not change. The Minister for Climate Change 
Issues stated “New Zealand is absolutely committed to reducing our emissions and to 
achieving the ambitious target we set before Paris. And we intend to do this within the 
context of economic growth, which remains a top priority for our Government….That’s why 
New Zealand is a strong supporter of the role of markets in reducing climate change, and why 
we led the Ministerial Declaration on Carbon Markets in December last year….It is clear that 
if this is going to seriously change behaviour, the price of carbon needs to be higher than it is 
now’ (Bennett, 2016a). To the Bluegreen Conference the same year she stated “While there 
might be a comparatively easy way for our farmers to move immediately to lower emissions 
[by reducing production] - it would have a huge impact on our competitive advantage” and 
for that reason Government focus would instead continue to be on a search for scientific 
innovations that would enable growth without increasing emissions (Bennett, 2016b). 
 
Growing tensions between business and Government 
The discourse of groups such as the Sustainable Business Council and Pure Advantage 
referred to above is now increasingly echoed across the New Zealand business sector, 
indicating a significant shift in attitude. The longitudinal nation-wide survey of New Zealand 
business sustainability practices, conducted every three years since 2003 by the authors of 
this paper, has shown fluctuations in the relative priority of economic growth over 
environmental and social sustainability. Particularly revealing was the 2010 survey that 
recorded what we termed a “sustainability divide” over the period of the recent global 
economic downturn, with some companies increasing their commitment to sustainability 
practices while others reduced it (Collins, Lawrence, Roper, & Haar, 2010). Those that 
increased their investment in sustainability tended to be either larger, exporting companies 
that are exposed to international market trends or those that are driven by moral rather than 
economic motives (Wang, Cheney, & Roper, 2015).  
By the 2013 survey, overall levels of sustainability commitment had still not reached those 
recorded prior to the economic downturn, which even then were low (Collins & Roper, 
2015). However, interviews conducted in late 2014 highlighted the extent and complexity of 
tensions within the business sector over issues of sustainability, in line with opposing 
practices found through the survey. For example, one interviewee from the wine industry 
acknowledged tensions in achieving widespread adoption of sustainability practices in a free 
market economy, but assumed that market solutions are the only option: 
…but you have to lead the market somewhere because if you don’t, if you just let 
people operate to make money you are not always looking after the best interests of 
the country... so it is a tough one because if you want to operate in the free market and 
still be able to control, I guess you’d have to use the market to control, like you can 
incentivize people by showing them that there is a market for it, that’s perhaps how 
you can change behaviour. 
In this instance, the solution is seen as being through incentives of being market leaders. 
Another interviewee saw industry self-regulation as the solution because “… the industry 
understands the parameters, the challenges and the variations.”  
Other interviewees acknowledged the problems of being a first mover in carving out “win-
win” solutions, in contrast to the accepted discourse of the business case for sustainability. 
For example, a food manufacturer stated: 
Once one company has kicked off an initiative in one area it’s generally easier to 
follow because they establish different price points in the market place to absorb 
costs.  It’s the first mover status that’s difficult.  And also sometimes there’s not 
always an obvious or immediate consumer benefit or an impact that consumers are 
willing to pay for.   
The interviews also revealed an emerging and unexpected trend: some business managers not 
only expressed concern at the lack of uptake of sustainability practices by their competitors, 
they were calling for government intervention through regulation. For example, a 
representative of the rail industry stated “We’re not going to switch to alternative fuels and 
put the price of freight up, we’d lose our customers.  Unless there’s that regulatory pressure 
to support you it’s hard.” In relation to carbon trading, an energy sector representative stated 
categorically that “What you need is regulatory certainty or people won’t commit.” These 
managers, along with others, are primarily those who have invested in change in the 
expectation of financial rewards, in line with the promises of the business case for 
sustainability, but who are not seeing the rewards materialise because of insufficient market 
pressure to force change by others.  
For some, the financial risk of not changing is linked to the risk to New Zealand’s lucrative 
environmentally pure national branding. For others, their investment in change has generated 
competitive disadvantages. The discursive shift away from long standing support for laissez-
faire policies, coming from within the Government’s key constituency, the business sector, 
clearly exacerbates tensions between Government and its stakeholders. The way it handles 
the tensions, within a framework of paradox and dialectics, and the potential implications for 
neoliberal hegemony are discussed in the next section. 
 
Discussion 
We expect to see tensions between competing political parties over policy platforms and 
selling those platforms to voters – such opposition is fundamental to democratic societies. We 
also expect to see those tensions based in ideological differences, with some differences 
greater than others. However, environmental and social sustainability present long term 
problems that sit uncomfortably with short term political cycles.  
Even a piecemeal approach to sustainability requires some action from the key actors of 
government and business but who and how remains contentious. The New Zealand 
Government initially adopted a selection approach to the dialectic and avoided engaging in 
general discussion of sustainability by removing the term from its discourse, and attempting 
to side-line it in practice. However, politically this was not possible because of the legacy of 
the previous Government (including ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and establishment of 
an ETS which gained international acclaim) and because of the high value of the country’s 
“green” brand for exports and tourism. Nor could the Government withdraw from the issue 
altogether.  
The chosen tactic, therefore, was one of integration, effected almost exclusively through 
discourse. “Sustainability” was reframed as, for example, “low carbon”. By articulating 
(Slack, 1996) environmental protection with economic growth the Government attempted to 
establish a common sense argument that both could be achieved simultaneously. If that 
argument could be accepted, then the subsequent discourse, based in weak ecological 
sustainability, would also hold: continued prioritisation of economic growth was justified on 
the assumption that scientific innovation would solve environmental impacts.  In line with 
neoliberal precepts, the Government refrained from enforcing sustainable business practice, 
instead encouraging voluntary change, if anything. In response to growing international 
pressure the Government has made small successive concessions that have enabled it to 
attempt to maintain the country’s reputation. The ETS is a prime example: it is a legislated 
measure but it sets low emissions targets, relative to other countries, and excludes the sector 
that accounts for nearly half the nation’s greenhouse gases.  
The New Zealand situation can be extrapolated to other countries that are led by 
conservative, neoliberal governments, including the US and Australia. The common approach 
has been to encourage voluntary measures and to present the business case for doing so. 
Some governments offer incentives for change, as a concession to purely market approaches. 
Such an approach has been lobbied for in New Zealand by many businesses, but rejected. 
Although, as indicated by our interviewees, incentives are seen by some as a necessary 
concession to bring about change, government incentives (as opposed to market incentives) 
fall into the category of subsidies and contradict the precepts of a free market. Instead, the 
New Zealand Government has relied upon investing in science in the hope of finding 
innovative solutions to farming emissions that also allow increased production. It has also 
continued to exempt agriculture from the ETS, although it did not reject the ETS for other 
sectors. Through these mechanisms it has, until recently at least, managed to uphold both its 
ideological beliefs and its voter support, as well as avoid making any fundamental changes in 
favour of environmental protection. 
From a paradox perspective (Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2015; Smith & Lewis, 2011) 
adjustments to tensions generated by sustainability concerns offer creative possibilities that 
allow solutions to short and long term problems. However, we suggest that it is instead an 
approach of dealing with and deflecting challenges separately rather than addressing the 
deeper, underlying concerns; continuous separate adjustments in response to the complex 
tensions inherent in sustainability are a means of managing opposition and legitimacy issues 
while at the same time maintaining the hegemonic core of neoliberalism, which is minimal 
regulation over the business sector. 
In practice, the business case for sustainability has been a difficult argument to sell, 
particularly if major change – and investment in change – is required. Some incumbent 
businesses, such as many in the fossil fuel industry have both resisted change in their 
practices and lobbied against government moves to make it mandatory (Geels, 2014; Urry, 
2013). At the other end of the spectrum, some have embraced sustainability principles as 
fundamental to their business (Laszlo & Zhexembayeva, 2011). Those who have taken up the 
business case substantively are industry leaders. Sometimes they are new companies that are 
started up under values based business models but others are either created or redesigned with 
a primarily profit motive. Notably, (Benn, Dunphy, & Griffiths, 2014) have set out a theory-
based trajectory for transforming business to strong sustainability principles with first movers 
gaining competitive advantage over those who follow, until the point where the laggards 
suffer not only from lost opportunity but because their way of doing business is no long 
supported by society (see also Zadek, 2004). The principles are in line with Beck’s (1992, 
1997b) assertion that as long as there are winners – those who are successful in creating 
business opportunities (and legitimacy) from environmental and social imperatives – there 
will also be losers.  
The New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development (and its World-wide 
counterparts) have begun to call for cross sector approaches to sustainability, and for “smart 
regulation”. The PureAdvantage group is made up of business leaders who arguably have a 
vested interest in ensuring their own market advantage in sustainable business, but who are, 
nevertheless, calling for government intervention by way of incentives and/or by legislation. 
Their call is in line with moves, particularly in European countries as noted earlier, for strong 
ecological modernisation that includes active political support (Jänicke, 2008). However, 
rather than being driven by government, the call is coming from the business sector to a 
government that has long supported, ideologically and politically, the demands of powerful 
polluters – the ‘losers’ of ecological modernisation -who maintain a traditional neo-classical 
discourse that environmental regulation would negatively impact the nation’s international 
competitiveness (Jänicke, 2008).  
The shift in business discourse is echoed elsewhere. In the UK John Elkington and his 
colleagues in Volans are calling for a recalibration of macro systems, including economies, as 
a means of addressing environmental and social problems, including wealth inequality. Their 
arguments are still made in the name of business sustainability and still rest upon a business 
case, but they view disruptive change of economic systems as the vehicle to continued 
business success (or survival) (Volans, 2013).  
We argue that by introducing a discourse of regulation as a solution to environmental (and 
social) sustainability, the business sector itself has opened a crack in the hegemony of free 
market economics. This is because the core premise of laissez-faire government is that 
business self regulates, according to market demands. If businesses that have invested in 
change through either moral or competitive motivations are not seeing returns on that 
investment, they now face a dialectic in the Bakhtinian (Bakhtin, 1981) sense. That is, by 
calling for regulation they lose their regulatory autonomy but protect their investment, and 
vice-versa. Advantages lie either way, as do disadvantages.  
The same “push-pull” dialectic applies to governments who face policy choices that will 
further divide their natural business electorate: do they continue to support their traditional 
voters or move towards the growing business group that wants government intervention; do 
they uphold their ideological beliefs in neoliberal economics or compromise them in favour 
of their own legitimacy? The pressures for change are growing, from within their own ranks, 
from international governments and consumer markets, and from voters.  Disruptive change 
is rarely fast or straightforward, especially if it disrupts long-held, hegemonic beliefs. 
Although the issues and associated interests are highly complex, once the discourse shifts 
fundamentally and gains momentum it can rarely be turned back. 
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